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ARGUMENT 
I. WHERE VOEST-ALPINE'S PRIMARY OBLIGATION UNDER THE 
LEASE WAS EXPRESSLY DELAYED BY MOUNTAIN STATES' 
FAILURE TO DELIVER TIMELY POSSESSION OF THE 
BUILDING TO VOEST-ALPINE, VOEST-ALPINE'S OBLIGATION 
TO SECURE INSURANCE COVERING MOUNTAIN STATES WAS 
LIKEWISE DELAYED. 
Because Mountain States failed to deliver possession of the building to Voest-
Alpine on March 1, 1994, the lease term did not commence and Voest-Alpine's primary 
obligation under the lease - the payment of rent - was not triggered. Furthermore, given 
the circumstances, nature, and purpose of the lease agreement, Voest-Alpine's obligation 
to secure insurance covering Mountain States was likewise delayed until Mountain States 
delivered possession of the building. The written terms of the lease are clear and 
unambiguous, with paragraph 2 providing: 
2.1 Term. 
The term of this lease shall be for a period commencing on the 1st 
day of March, 1994, and terminating twelve (12) months thereafter, unless 
sooner terminated or extended pursuant to any provision hereof. 
2.3 Delay in Commencement. 
The parties acknowledge time is of the essence of this lease, 
particularly with respect to completion of improvements and 
commencement of occupancy. Lessor agrees to make improvements 
("Lessor Improvements") set forth in Exhibit "C" and its attachments 
pursuant to the schedule for completion set forth therein ("Completion 
Schedule").... If for any reason Lessor cannot deliver possession of the 
premises to Lessee on March 1, 1994, Lessee shall not be obliged to pay 
rent. . . until possession is delivered. Possession cannot be delivered until 
the completion of item numbers 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 15 of Attachment 1 
to Exhibit "C". 
(R. 98) While it is clear from the terms of the lease that the lease was to commence on 
March 1, 1994 and that Mountain States' failure to deliver possession of the building to 
Voest-Alpine on that date delayed commencement of the lease and Voest-Alpine's 
obligation to pay rent, it is not clear what effect Mountain States' failure had on Voest-
Alpine's secondary obligations under the lease. Specifically, the lease is silent as to the 
effect of Mountain States' failure on Voest-Alpine's obligation to secure an insurance 
policy "insuring [Mountain States] and [Voest-Alpine] against any liability arising out of 
the ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance of the premises and all areas appurtenant 
thereto." (R. 94) Ordinarily, a contract's silence regarding an important term gives rise 
to an ambiguity requiring resort to extrinsic evidence in order to determine the intent of 
the parties. See Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) (fully 
integrated construction contract found to be ambiguous because contract was silent as to 
proper remedy for breach of the contract). In this case, however, the trial court found that 
the lease was clear and unambiguous and held that only Voest-Alpine's obligation to pay 
rent was delayed as a result of Mountain States' failure to deliver possession of the 
building on March 1, 1994. 
Voest-Alpine agrees that the written terms of the lease are clear and unambiguous, 
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however Voest-Alpine submits that the trial court's interpretation of the terms of the 
contract is erroneous.1 Specifically, Voest-Alpine challenges the trial court's finding that 
only Voest-Alpine's obligation to pay rent was delayed by virtue of Mountain States' 
failure to complete the required improvements to the building by March 1, 1994. Because 
Mountain States retained possession of the building and all rights of control over the 
building well beyond March 1, 1994, there is no justifiable basis for finding that Voest-
Alpine was obligated to secure a bodily injury and property damage insurance policy 
insuring Mountain States "against any liability arising out of the ownership, use, 
occupancy or maintenance of [Mountain States' building] and all areas appurtenant 
thereto[]" effective March 1, 1994. For all intents and purposes, Voest-Alpine's 
possession of Mountain States' building was the essence of the lease agreement. 
Accordingly, under the circumstances, Voest-Alpine's obligations under the lease, 
especially the insurance obligation, were triggered when Voest-Alpine took possession of 
the building and commenced paying rent to Mountain States. 
When asked to interpret the terms of a contract, this Court has stated that: 
lThis Court reviews a trial court's interpretation of an agreement for correctness, 
according no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. See Zions First Nat'l Bank 
v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988) ("Questions of contract 
interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on such 
questions we accord the trial court's interpretation no presumption of correctness.") 
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we interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable expectations of 
the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, 
nature, and purpose of the contract. 
Peirce v. Peirce. 2000 UT 7, f 19, 994 P.2d 193.2 See also. Utah State Med. Ass'n v. Utah 
State Employees Credit Union. 655 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 1982); Nixon & Nixon. Inc. v. 
John New & Assocs.. Inc.. 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982). Here, looking to Mountain 
States' and Voest-Alpine's lease agreement as whole, and to the circumstances, nature, 
and purpose of the lease, the parties reasonably expected that Voest-Alpine's lease 
obligations would be triggered when Mountain States delivered possession of the building 
to Voest-Alpine. 
Because the contract between Voest-Alpine and Mountain States was a lease 
agreement, Voest-Alpine's obligations were contingent upon Voest-Alpine's taking 
possession of the building. Voest-Alpine contracted with Mountain States for the 
exclusive use, possession, and enjoyment of Mountain States building. In return, Voest-
2In their reply brief, Mountain States challenges Voest-Alpine's citation to Peirce 
for basic principles of contract law on the basis that a postnuptial agreement was at issue 
in Peirce and not a commercial contract. See Mountain States' Reply Brief at p. 4. 
Mountain States' challenge is not well-taken. Voest-Alpine does not rely on the Court's 
application of contract law to the particular facts of Peirce. but merely relies on the 
Court's statements as to basic contract principles and general rules of contract 
interpretation. These rules are equally applicable to post-nuptial agreements and 
commercial contracts. Peirce. 2000 UT 7, f 20, 994 P.2d 193 ("Postnuptial agreements 
are a type of contract and are generally subject to basic contract principles."). 
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Alpine was obligated to pay rent to Mountain States and insure Mountain States against 
liability and damages that might arise as a result of Voest-Alpine's use and possession of 
the building. Mountain States' and Voest-Alpine's obligations therefore turn on 
possession of the building. So long as Voest-Alpine was in possession of the building 
and enjoying the use ai id benefits associated with possession, Voest-Alpine was obligated 
to pay rent to Mountain States and insure Mountain States against an> damage that might 
result from Voest-Alpine's use and enjoyment of the building. The lease expressly 
provided that Voest-Alpine would not be obligated to pay rent until Mountain States 
delivered possession of the building. 
Further, given the circumstances, i lati ire, and purpose of the lease, it follows that 
Voest-Alpine's additional obligations undei the lease, i i ihe insut nice obligating were 
likewise contingent upon Voest-Alpine taking possession of the building. So long as 
Mountain States retained possession and control of its building, Mountain States quite 
rightly bore responsibility for insuring itself and its building. There was no reason for 
Voest-Alpine to i;t isi n e a bi lildii lg it did i not possess, did i lot control, and had no rights 
over. Furthermore, there was no reason for Voest-Alpine to insure Mountain Stulcs 
against damage that might arise out of Mountain States' use and possession of its own 
building. The purpose of Voest-Alpine's insurance obligation was to protect Mountain 
States from i iiinages that might arise out of Voest-Alpine's use and possession of the 
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building. There is no justifiable basis for the contention that Voest-Alpine was obligated 
to procure a bodily injury and property damage public liability insurance policy covering 
Mountain States and Mountain States' building where Mountain States failed to deliver 
possession of the building to Voest-Alpine. Voest-Alpine would have been conferring a 
benefit upon Mountain States while receiving nothing in return. 
Mountain States does not dispute that it failed to deliver possession of the building 
to Voest-Alpine on March 1, 1994. In fact, as of March 1, 1994, Mountain States had 
failed to complete 8 of the 15 requisite improvements to the building. As a result of 
Mountain States' failure to satisfy the preconditions to Voest-Alpine's occupancy, Voest-
Alpine could not use, occupy or otherwise enjoy possession of the building. The fact that 
Voest-Alpine's employees were present in the building and assisting Mountain States 
with its improvements after March 1, 1994 is irrelevant to Voest-Alpine's insurance 
obligations under the lease. After March 1, 1994, the commencement of the lease was 
delayed and Mountain States retained exclusive possession and rights of control over its 
building. Voest-Alpine had no control over the building. Voest-Alpine's employees 
were on the premises with the permission of Mountain States. By permitting Voest-
Alpine's employees to enter the premises while Mountain States possessed and controlled 
the building, Mountain States assumed responsibility for the employees' presence. 
Accordingly, Mountain States had the obligation of insuring itself and its building 
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because it had exclusive control over the building. Voest-Alpine had no such obligation 
until Mountain States delivered possession of the building. 
Additionally, there is no basis for Mountain States' insinuation that Voest-Alpine 
began work on its commitments to (iencva Suv :Hor to taking possession of the 
building. See Mountain States' Reply Brief at p. 2. Voest-.A Ipine was actual Ij • unable to 
begin its work for Geneva Steel until Mountain States had made the requisite 
improvements to the building and delivered possession of the building to Voest-Alpine. 
To be sure, this is why the lease expressly provided that: "The parties acknowledge that 
time is of the essence of this lease, pai ttci ilarl> with respect to completion of 
improvements and commencement of occupan, \. (K. V5j U - IS no c\ idence 
whatsoever that Voest-Alpine was working for Geneva Steel prior to Mountain States' 
delivering possession of the building to Voest-Alpine. Mountain States' insinuation is 
wholly inappropriate and not supported any evidence in the record. 
Mountain States has failed to offer" any legitimate basis to support the trial court's 
finding that although Mountain States failed to meet its obligatioiis i indei 1:1 le coi ltract ; i id 
deliver possession of the building to Voest-Alpine, Voest-Alpine was nevertheless 
obligated to secure a bodily injury and property damage public liability insurance policy 
insuring !\lohu au t , .;nv liability arising out of Voest-Alpine's use, 
occupancy, and possession • < * -d, I he ti i.il \ mirl s interpretation of the 
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lease runs counter to the reasonable expectations of the parties, looking to the agreement 
as a whole and to the circumstances, nature and purpose of the contract. Under the 
circumstances, Voest-Alpine's obligations under the lease - including the payment of rent 
and securing an insurance policy insuring Mountain States - were triggered when Voest-
Alpine took possession of the building and received the benefits of occupancy. Until that 
point, Mountain States was responsible for insuring the building because it had complete 
control over and responsibility for the building. 
Because the trial court's interpretation of the lease is incorrect, this Court should 
reverse the trial court and enter summary judgment in favor of Voest-Alpine on the basis 
that the lease had not commenced at the time of the Bakwoski/Ramirez accident. Further, 
because the lease had not commenced at the time of the accident, Mountain States' 
insurers properly covered the Bakowski/Ramirez accident. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SET FORTH ITS REASONS 
FOR NOT AWARDING THE FULL AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY 
FEES SUBMITTED BY VOEST-ALPINE WARRANTS A REMAND. 
Because Voest-Alpine prevailed in the trial court, Mountain States was and is 
obligated to pay Voest-Alpine's reasonable attorney fees pursuant to paragraph 15.13 of 
the lease.3 Voest-Alpine submitted evidence to the trial court establishing that it incurred 
Paragraph 15.13 of the lease provides: "Attorney fees. If either party brings an 
action to enforce the terms hereof or declare rights hereunder, the prevailing party shall 
S 
attorney fees totaling $38,380.00 in defending against Mountain States' action. The trial 
court, however, only awarded Voest-Alpine $30,206.45 in attorney fees.4 The trial court 
did not explain its basis for awarding a lesser amount than that sought by Voest-Alpine. 
Because the trial court is required to state its reasons for awarding the lesser amount, the 
issue should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to set forth the basis of the 
amount of attorney fees awarded to Voest-Alpine.5 
This Court is unable to determine whether the trial court's reduction of the fees 
sought by Voest-Alpine is reasonable because the trial court offered no basis for the 
reduction. The trial court simply crossed out the amount listed in the pleadings drafted by 
Voest-Alpine's counsel and wrote in the lesser amount by hand without explanation. (R. 
1141; 1138) In Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213, 220 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990), the court stated: 
Trial courts should make findings which explain the factors which they 
consider relevant in making an attorney fee award, especially when they 
reduce the amount from that requested. 
be entitled to its reasonable attorney fees." (R. 86) 
4Admittedly, due to counsel's clerical error, Voest-Alpine initially submitted 
evidence that its attorney fees totaled only $30,206.45. However, Voest-Alpine informed 
the court of the error and submitted evidence indicating that it actually incurred 
$38,380.00 in attorney fees. (R. 1074; 1063) 
Additionally, the issue of attorney fees will have to be remanded to the trial court 
so that the it may determine the amount of fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in 
this appeal. 
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Here, the trial court made no such findings. As it stands, there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the trial court considered the evidence submitted by Voest-Alpine supporting 
its request for $38,380.00. Furthermore, there is nothing to support the trial court's 
reduction of the amount Voest-Alpine requested. 
Voest-Alpine submits that the trial court abused its discretion in reducing the 
amount of attorney fees requested by Voest-Alpine. "Where the evidence supporting the 
reasonableness of the attorney fees is both adequate and entirely undisputed, the court 
abuses its discretion in awarding less than the amount requested unless reduction is 
warranted by one or more of the factors described in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 
P.2d 985, 987-91." Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213, 220 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).6 Here, the 
evidence submitted to the trial court supports an award of $38,380.00. Mountain States 
does not contend that this amount is unreasonable. Accordingly, unless the trial court 
reduced the award pursuant to the one or more of Dixie factors, the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding less than the amount requested by Voest-Alpine. 
This Court should remand the issue to the trial court with instructions to review the 
6The Dixie factors include: the legal work actually performed; the reasonable 
necessity of the legal work to adequately prosecute the matter; the consistency of the 
attorney's billing with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services; 
and any circumstances requiring the consideration of other factors, such as those listed in 
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990 
(Utah 1988). Notably, clerical error is not a basis for reducing an attorney fee award. 
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amount requested by Voest-Alpine, to review the evidence in support of the award, and 
make findings which explain the factors which the trial court considers relevant in 
making the award. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's holding that the lease commenced on 
March 1, 1994, and find that because Mountain States failed to deliver possession of the 
building to Voest-Alpine, Voest-Alpine was not obligated to secure the insurance 
required under the lease until such time as Mountain States delivered possession of the 
building to Voest-Alpine. Additionally, this Court should remand the issue of attorney 
fees to the trial court with instructions to review the amount requested by Voest-Alpine; 
to review the evidence submitted by Voest-Alpine; and to make findings explaining the 
basis for the trial court's award. 
DATED this J ^ f d a y of September, 2001. 
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